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Kvanvig’s routes to this destination, I applaud and welcome his two most 
important bott om-line contentions: fi rst that epistemologists should think 
more about the value of knowledge and other epistemic states, and second 
that what normative epistemology should really be aft er is not knowl-
edge, but understanding.
NOTES
1. Thus, in eﬀ ect, Kvanvig: “Att ending to the relationship between knowl-
edge and understanding can give us hope in our pursuit of special and unique 
value for epistemic achievements, even though we have had to give up such 
hope regarding the cognitive achievement of knowledge” (p. 186). Cp. Burn-
yeat, The Theaetetus of Plato: “A bett er understanding of knowledge is the pre-
condition for solving the problem of false judgement (p. 200c–d).” 
2. This is my gloss, prompted by comparison with other contexts, where 
Kvanvig very frequently contrasts accounts of the nature with accounts of the 
value of knowledge. If there is a misprint here, it is not, unfortunately, the only 
one. (p. 13 “Daedelus” for “Daedalus”; p. 30 “Buryeat” for “Burnyeat”; on p. 
201 we have “laudatory” where the context demands “laudable,” on p. 108 
the non-word “virtuousity”; on p. 193 it is disappointing to fi nd Cambridge 
University Press, of all people, misspelling the Greek epistêmê.)
3. However we translate epistêmê. Kvanvig rightly points out that “knowl-
edge” may actually be a less accurate translation for what Plato has in mind 
than “understanding” (p. 193). “Science” (in a broad sense, like the German 
Wissenschaft ) might also be more accurate than “knowledge.”
The Cambridge Companion to Anselm, edited by Brian Davies and Brian 
Left ow. Cambridge University Press, 2004. 323 pages. $65.00 cloth/$29.99 
paper. 
SARAH BORDEN, Wheaton College (IL)
The Introduction to The Cambridge Companion to Anselm begins by de-
scribing Anselm of Canterbury as “at once one of the best- and least-
known of medieval thinkers” (p. 1). This volume of the Cambridge Com-
panion series does an excellent job of both oﬀ ering substantive pieces 
on the topics for which Anselm is already so well known (most notably, 
the ontological argument) and introducing readers to those for which 
he is not, but arguably ought to be. As the authors make clear, there is a 
breadth and passion to Anselm’s thought that can oft en be missed when 
simply reading Anselm as a set up for contemporary debate regarding 
God’s existence. 
There are twelve essays in this text, a substantive bibliography, and 
an index. Among the notable strengths of the volume is the spectrum of 
topics covered: biography, philosophy of language, modality, freedom, 
ethical theory, as well as theological topics including the Trinity and the 
atonement. Signifi cant as well is the variety of approaches. Peter King’s es-
say, “Anselm’s philosophy of language,” provides an analysis of Anselm’s 
texts on the topic. King writes, “[Anselm] takes up issues in the philosophy 
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of language in nearly everything he wrote” [84]), and King ends with a 
comparison with more modern conceptions. In contrast, Simo Knuutt i-
la’s “Anselm on modality” explicitly focuses on the context of Anselm’s 
thought, tracing the critical sources and comparing Anselm’s view with 
many of his own contemporaries. Like Knuutt ila, Gareth Matt hews’s essay 
(“Anselm, Augustine, and Platonism”) focuses on Anselm in his historical 
context, but with an emphasis on (albeit somewhat cursory) comparison 
between Augustine’s and Anselm’s thought on a few select topics. 
It is a strength of the volume that it includes both essays which read 
Anselm in his contemporary context and essays which place Anselm in 
the context of more modern debates. Perhaps the most successful at em-
phasizing Anselm’s relevance for modern debate while not allowing inter-
pretation of Anselm to be limited by modern categories is Sandra Visser’s 
and Thomas Williams’s discussion of Anselm on freedom. Visser and 
Williams open by noting reactions contemporary metaphysicians would 
likely have to Anselm’s defi nition of freedom (they say of Anselm’s defi ni-
tion of freedom of choice as ‘the power to preserve rectitude of will for 
the sake of that rectitude itself’: “From the point of view of contemporary 
metaphysics, this is one of the most unhelpful defi nitions imaginable” [p. 
179]). Throughout the essay, they point to places in Anselm’s texts where 
modern readers are likely to be perplexed, and they use this perplexity as 
an opportunity to explicate the subtlety of Anselm’s analysis of the vari-
ous types and meanings of freedom. It is an essay that left  me wanting 
more, suspecting that there are even more resources to mine in Anselm’s 
refl ections on a topic so important to contemporary thought. 
Among the striking and important theses argued for is that of Jeﬀ rey 
E. Brower. In the opening paragraph of Brower’s “Anselm on ethics,” he 
writes: “Although it is easy to overlook the systematic nature of Anselm’s 
ethical theorizing, as well as its genuine originality, his contribution to 
medieval ethical theory is considerable” (p. 222). Brower argues that “An-
selm’s theory is deontological in nature: unlike the eudaimonism charac-
teristic of this period, it separates morality from happiness (at least con-
ceptually) and emphasizes the need for agents to be motivated by justice 
rather than happiness” (p. 223). In doing this, Anselm ought to be given 
credit that is usually reserved for Duns Scotus; Anselm breaks with the 
Aristotelian tradition in ethics and thereby makes a substantive contribu-
tion to the development of ethical theory.
Although topically and methodologically varied, the volume also ex-
hibits a deep coherence. Several themes are picked up and repeated in 
numerous essays; the most obvious of which is a key theme introduced 
in the fi rst biographical chapter: correctness (rectitudo). (Unfortunately, 
the index does not cite well the recurrence of the idea.) Correctness for 
Anselm is not merely technical exactitude or a correspondence between 
mind and thing. Rather, correctness has to do fi tt ing into a whole, pos-
sessing a kind of harmony, and doing what a person or thing was meant 
to do. Thus, for example, in evaluating the truth of a statement, we ought 
not to be concerned simply with its correspondence but also its correct-
ness—that is, doing the kind of thing a statement is to do. The concern for 
rectitudo recurs regularly, and the diﬀ erent essays reveal multiple facets in 
Anselm’s use of the term. 
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Perhaps somewhat less surprising, given the skill of our editors, the 
two essays touching most directly on the ontological argument fi t well 
together and into the volume as a whole, and they provide a substan-
tive discussion of Anselm’s most famous proof. Brian Left ow in “Anselm’s 
perfect-being theology” summarizes Anselm’s project: “Roughly speak-
ing, Anselm is trying to fi nd descriptions that apply to God and would 
still have described Him even if only He existed” (p. 134), in contrast, for 
example, with the notion of God as Creator. Left ow provides an impor-
tant clarifi cation about why Anselm approaches questions of God in the 
way that he does and thus prepares us to engage rightly in the ontological 
argument. Brian Davies’s essay on that argument (“Anselm and the onto-
logical argument”) is, as one would expect, a model of clarity. 
Aft er complimenting the editors for great success at what is surely a dif-
fi cult task—bringing together a coherent but broad and varied volume on 
a thinker such as Anselm—it may seem a bit nit-picky to complain about a 
single infelicitous phrase in the Introduction. But perhaps the emphasis will 
highlight what the editors have accomplished. Davies and Left ow write in 
the Introduction that Anselm can be taken as a philosopher insofar as we 
understand a philosopher as “someone concerned to argue for conclusions 
in a cogent way” (p. 2). Surely Anselm was concerned to argue and do so 
cogently, but, as numerous essays in the volume show well, such thin ide-
als do not capture the depth and richness of Anselm’s own vision of what 
theoretical and philosophical activity is about. The volume makes clear 
that Anselm is a passionate thinker, convinced that truth is transformative 
and that refl ection on fundamental issues, especially God and the soul, is 
part of piety to God. To focus on the cogency of the arguments without 
also att ending to the quality and att itude of the soul making the arguments 
and the transformative nature of the topics studied, is to construe what 
it means to be a rational, reasoning human being in a way quite diﬀ erent 
from how Anselm would. Theoretical refl ection is about seeking truth, but 
truth for Anselm is not something that can be divided into parts. There are 
not many truths, but one truth. Thus the pursuit of truth does not involve 
a limited aspect of oneself (e.g., certain cognitive faculties) but includes the 
full transformation of the person. It is a vision foreign to modern ears but 
rich with resources—which makes this volume all the more welcome. 
Duns Scotus on God, by Richard Cross. Ashgate Studies in the History of 
Philosophical Theology, Ashgate Publishing Limited: Aldershot, 2005. 
289 pages.
JOHN KRONEN, The University of St. Thomas, St. Paul
This is a well researched, well writt en, and well argued book on an impor-
tant topic. Cross has succeeded admirably in a diﬃ  cult task—explaining 
enough of Scotus’s complex philosophy to allow those unfamiliar with 
either Scotus’s thought or medieval philosophy in general to follow, rea-
sonably well, the arguments Scotus oﬀ ers on a range of diﬃ  cult questions 
in natural and philosophical theology. 
